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Abstract 
We investigate profit shifting by the largest and systemically relevant European 
multinational banks using new data made available through country-by-country reporting 
for the financial years 2014-2016. We capture tax incentives for income shifting using a 
multilateral tax differential between the local tax rate and the tax rates in the other 
countries where the bank has operations. We find that profits - particularly those recorded 
in tax havens - are negatively affected by corporate taxation. Moreover, the bulk of income 
shifting seems to take place among subsidiaries, as foreign-to-foreign tax differences 
matter significantly more that home-to-foreign differentials. Simulation results suggest 
that the amount of shifted profits in tax havens is about 38% of true profits. The ratio 
between shifted and true profits drops to about 7% when selected non havens are 
considered.  
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1 Introduction 
“Base erosion constitutes a serious risk to tax revenues, tax sovereignty and tax fairness 
for OECD member countries and non-members alike. While there are many ways in which 
domestic tax bases can be eroded, a significant source of base erosion is profit shifting” 
(OECD, 2013). In the recent years, a series of scandals (Offshore leaks, Luxleaks, 
Swissleaks and Panama Papers) have raised attention on the role that financial institutions 
play in sheltering corporate or private wealth, possibly easing tax avoidance. Like any other 
multinational companies, financial institutions may take advantage of low tax jurisdictions, 
such as tax havens, to shift profits in order to reduce their global tax burden.  
Multinationals may avoid taxation implementing transfer pricing between entities under 
common control. For instance, they can strategically locate their intangible assets in a low 
tax country, so as to minimize taxes on income from royalties (Dischinger and Riedel, 
2011). They may also inflate costs in countries that offer tax relief on specific items, such 
as interest payments, thus ultimately increasing the leverage in high tax countries (Gu et 
al., 2015). Next to that, banks might also have an incentive to operate in tax and financial 
havens to take advantage of a less stringent regulatory environment than in advanced 
economies, including when it comes to rules on transparency and banking secrecy 
(Balakina et al., 2017).  
Against this background, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis the European Union 
(EU) has promoted a policy agenda aimed to enhance transparency and financial stability. 
On July 17th, 2013, the EU’s fourth Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) entered into 
force, affirming that “increased transparency regarding the activities of institutions, and in 
particular regarding profits made, taxes paid and subsidies received, is essential for 
regaining the trust of citizens of the Union in the financial sector. Mandatory reporting in 
that area can therefore be seen as an important element of the corporate responsibility of 
institutions towards stakeholders and society” (Recital 52 to Directive 2013/36/EU). In 
particular, article 89 requires a new country-by-country public reporting (CBCR) obligation 
for banks and investment firms, which have to disclose annually the geographical location 
of their operations, including detailed information on turnover, profit, taxes, government 
subsidies, and number of employees at the different locales. Thus, the CBCR requirements 
allow to study comprehensively the activities of EU banks worldwide, including in tax 
havens. This is a major advance, since commercial firm-level databases (such as Orbis) do 
not contain exhaustive information on multinational activities in these jurisdictions, as 
recently highlighted by Tørsløv et al. (2018).  
Failing to account for operations in tax havens has important implications for the analysis 
of the international allocation of corporate income. Figure 1 depicts profits per employees 
(in full-time equivalent units), as reported in the CBCR data, both at the global level, and 
separately for tax havens and non-havens, respectively. Each employee generates 48,000 
euros of profits on average. However, the partial averages range from roughly 40,000 in 
non-havens to 220,000 euros in tax havens. By the same token, while the overall average 
profitability (calculated as the ratio of profits over turnover) is around 20%, the value for 
tax havens is more than double, at 47% (1). The extent to which such abnormal profitability 
in low tax jurisdictions is the result of shifting accounting profits rather than of real activity 
is the object of our econometric analysis.  
 
                                           
(1)  See section 2 for further details about CBCR data. 
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Figure 1. Profits per employees (in Euro) and Profitability 
Notes: Profit per employees (left axis) is the ratio between Earnings Before Taxation (EBT) and the 
number of employees in full-time equivalent units. Profitability (right axis) is the ratio between EBT 
and Turnover. Country-by-country reporting data related to 2014-2016 financial years. 
 
Our paper is related to the literature on profit shifting, initiated by Hines and Rice (1994). 
Dharmapala (2014) provides a review of the numerous empirical contributions. When data 
allows, the focus is placed on the role played by tax havens in base erosion and income 
shifting. For instance, Dowd et al. (2017) uncover significant nonlinearities in the extent 
to which accounting profits of US corporations react to tax rates. The response is 
particularly strong in low-tax jurisdictions where supposedly the fiscal cost represents the 
main incentive for multinationals.  
While most of the empirical studies in the field focus on non-financial corporations, the 
literature on profit shifting by financial institutions is still limited. When investigating the 
effects of international double taxation on interest margins and foreign direct investment 
in the banking industry, Huizinga et al. (2014) find evidence of income shifting in the 
presence of low tax rates. Using a commercial database with bank-level data, Merz and 
Overesch (2016) find that the profitability of bank subsidiaries is much more sensitive to 
tax rates than that of non-financial companies. Their results suggest that it is somewhat 
easier for financial institutions to book profits internationally for tax reasons than it is for 
manufacturing companies. Interestingly, however, they do not consider tax havens in their 
analysis. In general, the evidence on global profit shifting by banks – including in tax 
havens – is limited by the data issues discussed above.  
Our study contributes to the literature on profit shifting by analysing the behaviour of 
European financial institutions. By exploiting a new dataset based on CBCR data, we can 
provide a comprehensive assessment of banks’ profitability in the global arena, including 
tax havens. To the best of our knowledge, we are among the first to use this data. Oxfam 
(2017) uses CBCR data for the 2014 financial year for descriptive analyses similar to the 
one we show in Figure 1. They take that as prima facie evidence of profit shifting to 
countries with low or zero corporate tax rate. Using data for a larger cross-section of banks 
from the same year, Bouvatier et al. (2017) estimate a gravity model to investigate the 
determinants of bank international operations. They find that tax havens attract a 
comparatively higher level of bank activities – proxied with turnover –, all other factors 
being equal.  
Thus, our study is the first attempt to examine comprehensively tax-induced income 
shifting by the biggest and systemically relevant European multinational financial 
institutions. To this purpose, we employ CBCR data for the 2014-2016 financial years. 
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Importantly, the use of a panel allows us to use fixed effects in order to control for 
unobservables that might affect profitability, so as to minimize the concern for omitted 
variable bias that plagues cross-sectional studies. Moreover, we employ a multilateral tax 
differential that appropriately captures tax incentives to income shifting, in the spirit of 
Huizinga and Laeven (2008). For multinational banks, the decision to book profits in a 
jurisdiction does not depend on the level of local taxation only. In fact, arbitrage 
possibilities are available if the level of corporate taxation differs across the jurisdictions 
where the group has operations. Thus, the parent company will allocate profits 
internationally in a strategic way, internalizing the overall bankruptcy cost implied by high 
debt levels. 
Our results suggest that bank profits respond to corporate taxes, and particularly so in 
low-tax countries. Simple simulations based on our econometric exercise indicate that 7% 
of true profits are subject to profit shifting activities for non-havens countries, while for tax 
havens this ratio increases to 38%. The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. 
Section 2 sketches the theoretical framework. Section 3 illustrates our empirical 
methodology. The data is presented in Section 4. Our main results, as well as robustness 
checks, are detailed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.   
 
2   Theoretical framework 
Our empirical analysis is based on the theoretical model developed by Huizinga and Laeven 
(2008) who extend to a multilateral context the workhorse model proposed by Hines and 
Rice (1994). In this setup, reported earnings can be separated into “true” profits generated 
by economic activity, and a second component stemming from profit shifting. Formally, 
the profits of a multinational banking group in country ܿ are:  
ܤ௖ ൅ ܵ௖ െ ߰ ሺܵ௖ሻଶ 2ܤ௖⁄ .     (1) 
In equation (1), ܤ denotes ‘true’ economic profits and ܵ is the amount of shifted profits. If  
ܵ ൐ 0	ሺܵ ൏ 0ሻ, then profits are shifted in (out of) country ܿ. The last term in equation (1) 
indicates the positive and convex total cost of profit shifting. The marginal cost of profit 
shifting is assumed to increase proportionally with the ratio of income shifted to true 
profits, ܵ௖/ܤ௖. This is because it becomes increasingly costlier to hide profit shifting from 
the tax authorities the larger the amount of relocated income, ceteris paribus (Haufler and 
Schjelderup, 2000). By the same token, the shape of the marginal cost reflects the fact 
that a company's accounts have to be distorted relatively little to accommodate a given 
level of profit shifting if true profits ܤ௖ are relatively large. The factor of proportionality is 
߰. The resulting total cost function (߰ ሺܵ௖ሻଶ 2ܤ௖⁄ ሻ	attains a minimum at ܵ௖ ൌ 0, and is 
symmetric.  
The multinational group maximizes after-tax profits given by:  
maxௌ೎ ෍ ሺ1 െ ݐ௖ሻ௖ ሺܤ௖ ൅ ܵ௖ െ ߰ ሺܵ௖ሻ
ଶ 2ܤ௖⁄ ሻ 
under the constraint that ∑ ܵ௖ ൑ 0	,௖  that is the flows of inward and outward shifted profits 
cancel out. This is because income shifting activities simply reallocate profits across 
jurisdictions, but do not create an additional return. In the equation above, ݐ is the tax rate 
on corporate profits. In the formulation we adopt, thus, profit shifting costs are assumed 
to be deductible from the tax base. Consistent with Hines and Rice (1994), the first-order 
conditions with respect to ܵ௖ look like:  
ሺ1 െ ݐ௖ሻ ቀ1 െ ߰ ௌ೎஻೎ቁ െ λ ൌ 0	,	for all ܿ ൌ 1,… , ݊, (2) 
where λ denotes, as usual, the Lagrange multiplier. Solving equation (2) for ܵ௖, we obtain 
the equilibrium value of profits shifted into country c by the multinational as:  
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ܵ௖ ൌ ቀ஻೎టቁ
ଵ
ሺଵି௧೎ሻ
∑ ቆ ಳೕభష೟ೕቇ൫௧೎ି௧ೕ൯
೙ೕಯ೎
∑ ቆ ಳೕభష೟ೕቇ
೙ೕᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௠௨௟௧௜௟௔௧௘௥௔௟	௧௔௫	ௗ௜௙௙௘௥௘௡௖௘
≡்೎ೕ
.     
(3) 
Equation (3) shows that inward profit shifting increase with the amount of true profits (ܤ௖) 
and decreases with the net-of-tax rate in the host country ሺ1 െ ݐ௖ሻ. This is a direct 
consequence of assuming that profit shifting expenses are tax deductible in the country 
where they are incurred. The second term on the right-hand side of equation (3) is a 
multilateral tax differential, which captures the fiscal incentives to record profits in country 
c vis-à-vis all the other locales where the multinational operates. The bilateral tax 
differences are aggregate into a weighted average, where the weights are given by the 
scale of bank operations, and the net-of-tax rates in the corresponding countries. 
Therefore, the composite tax difference conflates all information about incentives and 
potential for profit shifting in a multilateral setting.  
True and shifted profits add up to reported profits, gross of shifting costs. Thus, overall 
reported profits, denoted by ߨ௖, can be expressed as:  
ߨ௖ ൌ ൤ܤ௖ െ ܤ௖߰ ௖ܶ௝൨ ൌ ܤ௖ ൤1 െ
1
߰ ௖ܶ௝൨ 
(4) 
Huizinga and Laeven (2008) use equation (4) to derive an empirical model that can be 
taken to the data. Additional assumptions are needed, however, on the way true profits, 
which are unobserved, are generated. This is usually done using a production function 
approach, whereby true income is proxied with observable inputs in the production process. 
As is apparent from equation (4), the parameter ߰ plays a crucial role also in the empirical 
model, because its inverse captures exactly the responsiveness of reported profits to the 
multilateral tax differential. The next section discusses the empirical approach and its 
implementation more in detail.  
 
3   Empirical methodology 
To investigate profit shifting of international financial institutions we follow the standard 
identification strategy that links variations in tax rates to reported income in multinational 
subsidiaries, conditioning on other determinants of profits. Specifically, for the latter, we 
implement a production function approach that gives the “true” amount of profits that a 
bank would have generated without distortionary incentives (Hines and Rice, 1994). 
Moreover, we control for additional factors that drive profitability, such as macroeconomic 
variables and the quality of institutions in the host country.  
Our baseline model is as follows: 
݈݊	ሺߨ௚௖௧ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ௚ܶ௖௧ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊൫ܭ௚௖௧൯ ൅ ߚଷ݈݊൫ܮ௚௖௧൯ ൅ ߚସࢄࢉ࢚ ൅ ߛ௚ ൅ ߶௧ ൅ ߱௖ ൅ ߳௚௖௧, (5) 
where ߨ௚௖௧ are the earnings before taxes reported by each group g on its operations in a 
foreign country ܿ at time ݐ. ௚ܶ௖௧	is our measure of tax incentive, calculated as the weighted 
average of the bilateral tax differentials between country c and all the other group 
locations, derived from equation (3). As mentioned above, the coefficient for the tax term 
can be derived from the theoretical setup as the inverse of the parameter in the cost 
function, ߚଵ ൌ 1/߰. Following Dowd et al. (2017), we calculate the composite tax index 
using two alternative measures of taxation: the statutory tax rate and the effective tax 
rate obtained from the amount of taxes paid (for further details see the data section). The 
weights in the multilateral tax differential are given by the number of employees that the 
banking group has in each foreign jurisdiction. The theoretical model sketched in Section 
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2 would require a weighting scheme based on true profits, which are clearly unobserved. 
Hence, one has to look for a variable that approximates true profitability sufficiently well. 
For instance, Huizinga and Laeven (2008) use sales. However, Hines at al. (2016) point 
out that this variable might be fraught with problems as prone to manipulation precisely 
because of profit shifting. Therefore, we prefer the number of employees as weighting 
variable, since we believe it better reflects the actual size of foreign operations.  
Capital	ሺܭ௚௖௧) and labour	ሺܮ௚௖௧), both in logs, are the inputs in the production function, which 
are meant to measure the level of “normal” profits. We measure labour as the number of 
employees (full-time equivalent) employed by each group in each country. In the case of 
banks, measuring the capital input is less straightforward. A standard proxy used in profit 
shifting studies for non-financial companies is the amount of fixed capital. By contrast, 
considering the role of banks as financial intermediaries, the very same definition of what 
constitutes an input (other than labour) is not as clear and immediate. Hence, following 
Merz and Overesch (2016), we consider fixed and financial assets as an input. Since the 
CBCR data do not report information on assets at the country-group level, we use balance 
sheet data from the Orbis Bank Focus dataset. Specifically, we consider the consolidated 
value of total assets at the group level and then we apportion it among the different group 
locales as reported in the CBCR data. Assets are attributed in proportion to the share of 
turnover that each observation has in the respective group turnover. Indeed, the rationale 
is that turnover is normally generated where assets are located.  
The vector ࢄࢉ࢚ includes two indicators for governance quality, which capture: (i) the quality 
of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of the government's commitment to such policies (“Government effectiveness”); (ii) the 
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development ( “Regulatory quality”) (2). The country-
specific variables are taken with one year lag to avoid endogeneity issues.  
The estimating equation (5) also includes a set of fixed effects. In particular, ߛ௚ indicates 
group dummies, which allow us to account for the structure of each banking group. Group 
dummies are enough to control for selection effects if the location pattern of the group is 
constant over time, or if location patterns change for reasons entirely unrelated to changes 
in tax rates. Time-varying common shocks are captured by year dummies (߶௧). Finally, ߱௖ 
are country level fixed effects that control for unobserved time-invariant differences among 
jurisdictions. Given our composite tax variable, the use of country fixed effects does not 
imply that we have to rely only on time series variation to identify the impact of corporate 
taxes, which would be the case if we used the tax rate in the host country as fiscal variable. 
Finally, ߳௚௖௧ is the error term.  
 
4   Data 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the largest and systemically relevant international banks 
based in Europe. In 2016 the Financial Stability Board (FSB), in accordance with the  Basel  
Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  (BCBS)  and  national  authorities, identified a list 
of institutions worldwide as systemically important (3), thirteen of which are also indicated 
by the European Banking Authority (EBA) as systemically relevant (4). Therefore, we 
include these banks in our dataset. We also include other international banks among those 
supervised by the ECB (5) in 2016 with total assets above 150 billion euro. Overall, we 
gather information on 27 multinationals banks headquartered in 8 European countries (i.e. 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United 
                                           
(2) For further information on how the indicators are constructed, see Kaufmann et al. (2011). Data can be found 
at the following link: www.govindicators.org. 
(3)  See:http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks-G-SIBs.pdf. 
(4)  See:http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/global-systemically-important-institutions/2017. 
(5)  See:https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/list_of_supervised_entities_20160331.en.pdf. 
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Kingdom), and operating in 90 jurisdictions worldwide. The full list is reported in Appendix 
1 (6).  
A definite advantage of the newly available data we use is the information on bank 
operations in tax havens, as these jurisdictions are not well represented in commercial 
databases. To single out differences between havens and high-tax countries, however, we 
must preliminarily adopt a classification to distinguish the two types of jurisdictions. Even 
if there is not a univocal definition of tax haven (Palan et al., 2013), a number of features 
have been associated with that concept, such as no or low taxes, lack of effective exchange 
of information and lack of transparency (OECD, 1998). The policy packages implemented 
are often called Preferred Tax Regimes (PTRs) which could imply, for specific economic 
agents, such as foreign financial institutions, a reduction in taxation and removal of 
regulation. Dharmapala and Hines (2009) uncover a number of characteristics more likely 
associated to the tax havens status of a country. Among them, size seems to be quite 
relevant. Given the potentially arbitrary nature of the definition, there are several 
classifications for tax havens. In our analysis, we rely on the one by Gravelle (2013), which 
is widely used in the literature and thus allows us to compare our results with the findings 
from other studies (7).  
We build our dataset using different sources – the main one being the CBCR data, which 
we describe in turn.   
 
4.1   CBCR data 
Since January 1st, 2015, financial institutions have to publicly disclose, on a consolidated 
basis and for each financial year, country-by-country data about their affiliates 
(subsidiaries or branches). Information disclosed under the CBCR obligation consists of: 
(a) name, nature of activities and geographical location; (b) turnover (net income); (c) 
number of employees on a full time equivalent basis; (d) profit or loss before tax (8); (e) 
tax on profit or loss; (f) public subsidies received. In this study we rely on three waves of 
data, covering the 2014-2016 financial years. For each financial institution, we collect CBCR 
data using consolidated annual reports and information available on banks’ official 
websites.  
Banking groups report the required data aggregated at the national level. This implies that, 
in each year, there is just one observation for each country in which they have at least one 
affiliate. Overall, we have collected 2,361 observations. Since the data is self-reported, we 
have carefully checked the quality of the information, to the extent possible. We first drop 
all observations with a negative turnover, as this might be an indication of inactive banks. 
This leads us to exclude 220 observations. Next, in 68 cases the reported number of 
employees is zero, while turnover is positive. In these cases, we corrected the number of 
employees to one, under the hypothesis that at least one employee on a full time 
equivalent basis is needed to generate a positive turnover. Finally, we drop further 356 
observations reporting negative profits. This is because, since we are investigating profit 
shifting, we need to limit our sample to observations with positive profitability.  
 
4.2   Tax variables 
                                           
(6)  The financial institutions included in the dataset are: Abn Amro, Barclays, Bayerische, BBVA, Belfius, BNP 
Paribas, BPCE, Commerzbank, Credit Agricole, Credit Mutuel, Deutsche Bank, Dz Bank, HSBC, ING, Intesa 
SanPaolo, KBC, Landersbank Hessen Thuringen, Lloyds, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Nationwide Building 
Society, Norddeutsche, Nordea, Rabobank, RBS, Santander, Societe’ Generale, Unicredit.  
(7)   Gravelle’s (2013) list of tax havens combines the following sources: (i) Hines and Rice (1994), more oriented 
to business issues; (ii) Tax Justice Network, “Identifying Tax Havens and Offshore Finance Centers:  
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Identifying_Tax_Havens_Jul_07.pdf; (iii) OECD (2000). See 
Appendix 1 for the list of tax havens countries in our sample, following the classification of Gravelle (2013). 
(8) In the rest of the paper, when we use the word “profits” we refer to reported profit or loss before tax. 
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As usually done in the literature, we consider the statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rate 
as a measure for profit shifting incentives. In particular, we collect information on the top 
statutory rates applicable to financial institutions, including potential surcharges, in all the 
jurisdictions where the banks in our sample report operations according to CBCR data (9). 
Our main sources are the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), Trading 
Economics and the annual corporate tax summaries elaborated by Deloitte & Touch, Ernst 
& Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers. However, as is well documented, the CIT 
might not properly reflect the marginal rate at which a company is de facto taxed. For 
instance, certain types of income might be subject to reduced taxation, or companies, 
particularly multinationals, might be granted tax holidays or be able to negotiate tax 
rebates (10). Thus, following Dowd et al. (2017), we employ a measure of the effective tax 
burden alternative to the statutory rate. Specifically, we exploit the information on taxes 
reported in the CBCR data to calculate a measure of effective tax rate (ETR). We proceed 
as follows. First, for each country-year-group observation, we obtain the effective rate of 
taxation by dividing the amount of taxes on profits by the EBT (11). Then, we aggregate 
these rates into a profit-weighted average ETR at the country-year level. To avoid 
endogeneity issues, we assign to each observation the relevant ETR in the host country, 
calculated excluding the reference observation-specific effective tax rate (12). For this 
reason, we restrict our analysis to jurisdictions where, in each year, at least two banking 
groups have operations. 
Figure 2 plots the distribution of the difference between CIT and ETR. In line with Dowd 
et al. (2017), we find that the spread between statutory and effective rates has a positive 
skewness, likely reflecting the fact that countries often provide tax preference 
arrangements to multinationals. As discussed above, our variable of interest in the 
econometric analysis is the multilateral tax difference, which captures the full set of 
incentives and possibilities to shift profits internationally. To get a grasp of the relationship 
between the tax level and the composite tax indicator, in Figure 3 we plot the two variables 
for both the statutory and the effective rates.  
 
4.3   Sample analysis 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the raw CBCR data and the tax rates, as detailed 
in the previous subsections, for the full estimating sample of foreign operations, as well as 
for tax havens and other countries, separately. The total number of observations is 1,622. 
On average, the turnover is 420 million euro. In relation to the number of employees full-
time equivalent, while the overall average is 1,751 units, 2,052 workers on average are 
employed in non-havens, while only 668 in tax havens. In fact, expectedly, banks allocate 
the bulk of their activity in non-haven countries, which are bigger and mostly developed 
economies. However, the ratio of turnover over employees is higher in tax havens, 
specifically 0.49 million euro per employees in tax havens and 0.22 in non-havens. 
Furthermore, with respect to havens, profits are smaller in non-havens, while taxes are 
higher. This means that the tax burden in tax havens is lower, as confirmed by the ETR, 
which is ten percentage points higher in non-havens. In line with the ETR, also the CIT 
confirm a higher tax burden in non-havens, being in all the three groups higher than the 
ETR.   
                                           
(9) In the case of Jersey, financial institutions may be taxed either at a zero rate (the general rate) or at a 10% 
rate. The latter rate is applicable to financial institutions classified as such according to national regulations. 
As we are not able to verify whether the regulatory conditions are met, we assume that the 10% rate applies 
to all operations located in Jersey.  
(10)  In fact, as reported by OECD (2015), the “headline statutory tax rates are often not the tax rate applicable 
at the margin of BEPS behaviour, due to specific country tax rules or administrative practices”. 
(11)  To minimize the impacts of outliers, we winsorize the effective rates using a cut-off of 2.5% in both tails. 
Taxes on profits is the amount of accrued current tax expense recorded on taxable profits for the reporting 
fiscal year.   
(12)  There are 193 cases in which the amount of the reported taxes paid is negative. This could be due to specific 
circumstances, such as the effects of loss carry-forward provisions. We consider these negative values as 
zeros when we calculate the effective tax rate. 
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Figure 2. Gap between statutory and effective tax rates 
 
 
Figure 3. Multilateral tax difference and tax rates 
a) Statutory tax rate b) Effective tax rate 
  
 
   
Table 1. Main variables - summary statistics. 
Notes: Summary statistics over the period 2014-2016 are reported for the full sample and two subgroup of tax havens and non-
havens. CBCR data are in euro/mln, except employees that are in full-time equivalent (FTE) units. 
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Variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
CBCR
Turnover 420 1,192 0.1 15,616 330 1,383 1 15,616 445 1,133 0.1 11,829
Employees 1,751 4,363 1 31,303 668 2,725 1 29,664 2,052 4,674 1 31,303
Profits 154 493 0 9,806 179 820 0 9,806 148 352 0 3,727
Taxes 30 91 0 1,313 23 114 0 1,313 32 84 0 1,133
TAX RATES
CIT 0.23 0.09 0.00 0.40 0.15 0.10 0.00 0.35 0.25 0.07 0.10 0.40
ETR 0.17 0.09 0.00 0.50 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.33 0.18 0.09 0.00 0.50
Observations 1,622 1,622 1,622 1,622 352 352 352 352 1,270 1,270 1,270 1,270
Full sample Non havensTax havens
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5   Results 
This section illustrates the results from estimating model (5) with ordinary least squares. 
We first present the baseline results, and then perform some robustness checks focusing 
on the role of the headquarters in income shifting strategies. As discussed above, we use 
a full set of country, time and banking group fixed effects. In all cases, we cluster standard 
errors at the group level to account for within-group correlation of the residuals. 
5.1   Main results 
Table 2 reports our main results. The specifications in columns (1) and (2) use the 
multilateral tax index calculated with the CIT rate and the ETR, respectively. The results 
show that both coefficients are negative and statistically significant. Indeed, the higher the 
tax burden faced by banks in the host country compared to the other foreign jurisdictions, 
the lower is the level of reported earnings. Specifically, the coefficient of the multilateral 
tax differential calculated using the CIT rate is -3.13, and significant at the 5% level. The 
specification in column (2) uses the effective tax rates to calculate the multilateral tax 
differential. The point estimate is -2.12, and is statistically significant at 1%. As expected, 
employment and banking assets are strongly significant determinants of bank profitability. 
By contrast, the impact of institutional quality on earnings is not estimated with precision.  
When analysing profit shifting of US multinationals, Dowd at al. (2017) uncover significant 
heterogeneity in response across the distribution of tax rates, with profits recorded in low-
tax jurisdictions being particularly sensitive to the local tax burden. To verify whether this 
holds also for our sample of EU multinational banks, we split the sample into two sub-
samples for tax havens and non-havens, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) report the 
results from estimating our profit equation on the subsample of tax havens, which 
comprises roughly one-fifth of the total observations. As expected, the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficients is larger (in absolute value) than that for the full sample, roughly 
twice as large. In the case of the CIT, the effect is not statistically significant, possibly due 
to the limited variability of the multilateral tax differential in the subsample. By contrast, 
the tax measure obtained with the effective tax rates retains its significance, at 5% level. 
Interestingly, profits recorded in tax havens are significantly affected by the institutional 
environment in the host jurisdictions. Specifically, reported profits decrease with a higher 
level of regulatory quality. This result might stem from the fact that an opaque regulatory 
framework is favouring profits shifting, for instance because of enhanced secrecy and 
barriers in exchanging information with other countries.  
Specifications (5) and (6) estimate model (5) on the subsample of countries that are not 
classified as tax havens according to Gravelle (2013). Expectedly, the coefficient estimates 
are only marginally smaller (in absolute value) than those obtained on the full sample, 
confirming the more muted impact of taxation on earnings recorded in relatively high-tax 
jurisdictions. Again, factors in the production function are found an important determinant 
of profits, while we do not find a statistically significant impact of the institutional variables. 
Finally, it is interesting to notice the different role played by labour and capital across group 
of countries. While for tax havens the estimated coefficients for the two inputs have a 
similar magnitude (around 0.3), non-havens seem to rely more markedly on the labour 
factor than on capital to generate profits. This is in line with the descriptive evidence in 
Figure 1, where income shifting artificially inflates the figures for labour productivity in tax 
havens.  
The multilateral tax differential is not a policy variable that can be directly observed. In 
order to interpret the coefficients in a standard way, so as they reflect profit shifting 
incentives in response to changes in the relevant host country tax rate, we need some 
additional calculations. In this way, we can also better place our results in the context of 
the literature. Specifically, for each group-country observation, we calculate the variation 
of reported profits due to a one percentage point increase of the local tax rate, as ݀ߨ௖ ൌ
െߚመଵߨ௖ሺ݀ ௖ܶ/݀߬௖ሻ݀߬௖, where ߬௖	is the relevant effective tax rate, our preferred tax measure. 
Thus, we use the corresponding coefficients ߚመଵ equal to -4.47 and -1.81 for tax havens and 
other countries, respectively, as obtained in table 2. We evaluate the differential ሺ݀ ௖ܶ/݀߬௖ሻ			 
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numerically assuming a 0.01 increase in the effective tax rate. Then, we sum up all the 
variations in earnings by country, obtaining the change in overall profits recorded in each 
jurisdiction, ∑ ݀ߨ௖௖ . Finally, we calculate the semi-elasticity of reported profits to the 
effective tax rate as െ ଵ∑ గ೎೎
∑ ௗగ೎೎
ௗఛ೎ .  These semi-elasticities can be placed in the context of the 
literature. They are reported in Table 3. As is apparent, the average semi-elasticity of 
profits to a 1 percentage point increase in the effective tax rate in selected non havens is 
1.94, while for tax havens the value increases to 4.22. The estimates for tax havens are 
in the same ballpark as the recent evidence on US multinationals by Dowd et al. (2017). 
By contrast, the values for non-havens are somewhat larger than previous findings, and 
broadly consistent with the results in Merz and Overesch (2016). Broadly, this also 
corroborates the intuition that modalities and intensity of income shifting in the service 
sector, including financial institutions, are different from that taking place in the 
manufacturing sector (Hines et al., 2016).  
Table 2. Profit shifting equation – baseline estimates 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of earnings before taxes. Estimation method: OLS. Heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustered at the group level are reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES lnebt lnebt lnebt lnebt lnebt lnebt
Tax difference (statutory) -3.13** -5.58 -2.47*
(1.37) (8.27) (1.44)
Tax difference (effective) -2.12*** -4.47** -1.81***
(0.32) (1.82) (0.33)
ln(Labour) 0.50*** 0.47*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.55*** 0.53***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04)
ln(Capital) 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.16*** 0.15***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
ln(Per capita GDP) t-1 -0.22 0.21 0.91 1.85 -1.52 -1.11
(1.06) (1.17) (1.43) (1.61) (0.96) (1.15)
Government Effectiveness t-1 0.33 0.33 1.71 1.20 0.18 0.22
(0.26) (0.29) (1.11) (0.96) (0.31) (0.33)
Regulatory Quality t-1 -0.42 -0.60 -1.26* -1.21* 0.06 -0.11
(0.47) (0.47) (0.70) (0.71) (0.52) (0.51)
Time dummies x x x x x x
Bank group dummies x x x x x x
Country dummies x x x x x x
Observations 1,622 1,622 352 352 1,270 1,270
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.69 0.57 0.59 0.72 0.73
Full sample Non HavensTax Havens
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Table 3. Elasticities of reported profits to the host country effective tax rate  
 
* Countries classified as tax havens in Gravelle (2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
Selected countries Semi-elasticity
Austria 1.65
Bahamas* 3.86
Bahrain* 3.73
Belgium 1.83
Bermuda* 3.80
Bulgaria 1.55
Cayman Islands* 3.58
Croatia 1.85
Czech Republic 1.66
Denmark 1.40
Finland 1.45
France 2.89
Germany 2.25
Gibraltar* 3.58
Greece 1.56
Guernsey* 4.04
Hong Kong* 3.54
Hungary 2.38
Ireland* 4.14
Isle of Man* 4.08
Italy 2.32
Jersey* 4.08
Latvia 1.78
Lithuania 1.74
Luxembourg* 5.00
Malta* 4.91
Mauritius* 3.89
Monaco* 4.84
Netherlands 2.47
Poland 2.01
Portugal 1.89
Romania 1.77
Singapore* 4.41
Slovakia 1.89
Slovenia 1.69
Spain 2.17
Sweden 2.38
Switzerland* 6.08
United Kingdom 1.90
United States 2.05
Average 2.85
Average tax havens 4.22
Average non-havens 1.94
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5.2   The role of headquarters 
Our main results show that international tax differences affect the amount of profits 
reported in each country. The multilateral tax measure employed in the analysis captures 
the set of incentives that a multinational bank faces in all jurisdictions where it operates, 
including the home country. However, the magnitude of income shifting is not necessarily 
homogeneous across locales. We investigate this issue by splitting the tax variable into 
two separate components capturing the parent-to-foreign versus the foreign-to-foreign 
channels of income shifting, as follows:  
	 ௖ܶ௝ ൌ 1ሺ1 െ ݐ௖ሻ
ۏ
ێێ
ۍ൬ ܤ௣1 െ ݐ௣൰ ൫ݐ௖ െ ݐ௣൯
∑ ൬ ܤ௝1 െ ݐ௝൰
௡௝
൅
∑ ൬ ܤ௝1 െ ݐ௝൰ ൫ݐ௖ െ ݐ௝൯
௡௝ஷ௖,௣
∑ ൬ ܤ௝1 െ ݐ௝൰
௡௝ ے
ۑۑ
ې
 
 
(6) 
 
The first term in square brackets indicates the differential between the parent rate and the 
rate in the host country. The latter summarizes the tax differential between the host and 
the tax rates in all remaining foreign affiliates.  
Table 4 reports the results. Specifications (1) and (2) show the results with the tax variable 
calculated using the CIT and the ETR, respectively. The tax terms have the expected 
negative sign. In particular, the tax differential among all foreign locations hovers around 
-3.5 and is highly statistically significant. By contrast, the differential with respect to the 
parent is much lower in size (in absolute value) and not statistically significant. Hence, 
there is evidence that the bulk of tax-induced income shifting takes place among 
subsidiaries, rather than between the home country and foreign jurisdictions. While this is 
consistent with previous results in the literature, the explanation is still an open question 
(Dharmapala, 2014). We thus run further regressions to shed more light on the asymmetry 
between home country and foreign locales as a source of outward income shifting.  
We cannot rule out that business cycle conditions play a role in our findings. In our sample, 
which spans over a few post-crisis years, a possible explanation concerns the profit position 
of the headquarter locations. It could be that the more muted impact of the tax differential 
with the domestic market is due to the fact that the domestic operations have negative 
profitability. To verify this hypothesis, we estimate the same model using only foreign 
observations for groups reporting positive profits in their domestic market. The coefficient 
of the tax difference with the parent is larger (in absolute value) than for the full sample. 
The tax differentials calculated with the CIT are not significant. However, that with the ETR 
is significant at 10%.  
Another possible explanation lies in the fact that multinationals tend to bias the location of 
profits and highly profitable assets in favour of the headquarter location (Dischinger et al., 
2014a). Dischinger et al. (2014b) find indeed that this affects profit shifting strategies of 
multinational groups. Specifically, they find that profit shifting between the domestic and 
foreign operations is significantly larger if the parent has a lower tax rate than the foreign 
country, and profit is thus shifted towards the home country. Following Dischinger et al. 
(2014a), we estimate our model on the full sample including also the group-country 
observations in their home market. In total, 60 observations are added, namely those 
reporting positive EBT. The model also includes a dummy that takes the value one if the 
country-group observations is in the home country (i.e. the headquarter observation). In 
line with expectations, the dummy is positive, and statistically significant.  
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Table 4. Profit shifting equation ‐ splitting the tax difference  
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of earnings before taxes. Estimation method: OLS. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered at the group level in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
5.3   Quantifying income shifting 
We can use the coefficients estimated in the previous section, combined with the 
theoretical framework illustrated in section 2, to quantify the effect of tax planning on the 
international allocation of bank profits. In this exercise, we consider only the redistribution 
of corporate tax bases by the banks in our sample, without further implications for 
profitability in the whole banking sector or more aggregate variables. Likewise, we do not 
attempt any estimation of the implied tax revenue losses for the countries where the banks 
operate, as these would be surrounded by even a greater deal of uncertainty than our 
profit estimates. Nonetheless, we believe the exercise is informative of the order of 
magnitude of the profit shifting activities we uncover in our econometric analysis.  
Our starting point is equation (4), where we assume that the tax differential variable fully 
captures profit shifting, i.e. the difference between observed and true profits. Thus, true 
economic profits can be expressed as:  
ܤ௖ ൌ ߨ௖/ሺ1 െ ߚመଵ ௖ܶሻ, (7) 
where ߨ௖	is the amount of reported profits in the CBCR data, and ߚመଵ is the estimated 
coefficient for the multilateral tax difference ௖ܶ. As for the latter, we consider our preferred 
tax measure based on effective tax rates. To fully account for heterogeneous tax effects 
across tax havens and non-havens, we employ the corresponding coefficient estimates in 
columns (4) and (6) in Table 2, equal to -4.47 and -1.81 respectively. In turn, profits 
shifted inward by each multinational can be derived using the accounting identity that 
reported profits are equal to the sum of true and shifted profits, or ߨ௖ ൌ ܤ௖ ൅ ܵ௖. Specifically, 
substituting the expression for true profits ܤ௖ from equation (7), one can express  shifted 
income as ௚ܵ௖௧ ൌ െߚመଵ ௖ܶܤ௖/ሺ1 െ ߚመଵ ௖ܶሻ. Thus, from the group-specific values we calculate the 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tax difference with parent (statutory) -1.84 -2.70 -2.10
(1.80) (2.53) (1.78)
Tax difference with other foreign affiliates (statutory) -3.70** -3.33 -4.28***
(1.40) (2.39) (1.35)
Tax difference with parent (effective) -0.56 -0.94* -0.81
(0.52) (0.47) (0.52)
Tax difference with other foreign affiliates (effective) -3.42*** -3.63*** -3.48***
(0.67) (0.91) (0.68)
ln(Labour) 0.50*** 0.47*** 0.49*** 0.47*** 0.50*** 0.47***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
ln(Capital) 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.19***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
ln(Per capita GDP) t-1 -0.20 0.28 -0.61 -0.03 -0.25 0.26
(1.07) (1.20) (0.93) (1.11) (1.06) (1.19)
Government Effectiveness t-1 0.33 0.29 0.42 0.37 0.36 0.33
(0.27) (0.29) (0.35) (0.35) (0.27) (0.29)
Regulatory Quality t-1 -0.43 -0.58 -0.12 -0.37 -0.44 -0.62
(0.47) (0.46) (0.60) (0.61) (0.46) (0.46)
parent dummy 0.55* 0.58**
(0.28) (0.28)
Time dummies x x x x x x
Bank group dummies x x x x x x
Country dummies x x x x x x
Observations 1,622 1,622 1,155 1,155 1,682 1,682
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.73
Baseline sample Foreign affiliates of loss-
making parents excluded
Parents included
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aggregate amount of income shifted to each jurisdiction by aggregating over the 
multinational banks operating there. Finally, to limit the influence of extreme values, we 
average over our sample period.  
Table 5 shows the results. The overall amount of profits shifting activities for non-havens 
is 2.5 billion euro, while tax havens experience inward profit shifting for about 5.8 billion 
euro. Expectedly, high-tax European countries, such as France, Italy, and Germany, 
experience outward profit shifting. The ratio of shifted income to true income ranges 
between 8 and 36%, for an overall amount of lost tax base of around to 1.2 billion euro. 
The flip side of this is the significant inward profit shifting recorded in tax havens, 
particularly the small ones. Perhaps counterintuitively, Switzerland records significant 
outward profit shifting, amounting to about 24% of total true economic profits, potentially 
to the benefit of other low tax countries. Johannesen and Zucman (2014), assessing the 
effect of bilateral treaties on information exchange signed between the G20 countries and 
tax havens, find a significant shift of deposits to havens not covered by a treaty. Thus, the 
agreement signed between Switzerland and the EU (13) that put an end to the bank secrecy 
regime benefitting EU-resident clients, had an influence on banks incentives to record 
profits there (14). All in all, non-havens experience profit shifting activities equal to the 7% 
of total true economic profits, while for tax havens this ratio is more than five times higher, 
equal to 38%.  
 
6   Conclusion 
Profit shifting represents a significant source of tax base erosion. While there are many 
studies on profit shifting made by multinational enterprises, less attention has been given 
to financial institutions, due to the lack of data. Exploiting country-by-country reporting 
made compulsory by the EU capital requirement Directive IV, we analyse profit shifting by 
the largest and systemically relevant European multinational banks. We find that corporate 
tax differences drive the international allocation of profits, with significant income shifting 
that takes place among bank subsidiaries. Moreover, profits recorded in tax havens are 
particularly sensitive to tax variables. Our results suggest the presence of profit shifting 
especially towards tax havens. Simple simulations indicate that 7% of true profits are 
subject to profit shifting activities for non-havens countries, while for tax havens this ratio 
increases to 38%.  
 
                                           
(13) The agreement has been signed on the 27th of May 2015 and under the agreement there will be, from 2018, 
an automatic exchange of information on the financial accounts of each other's residents (i.e. Switzerland 
and EU citizens). 
(14) Reported profits in Switzerland drop by 11% between 2015 and 2016.  
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Table 5. Computations of profit shifting activities, aggregated at the national level (mln Euro). 
 
* Countries classified as tax havens in Gravelle (2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selected countries
True economic profits 
(B)
Shifted profits         
(S)
Ratio between shifted 
and true profits  (%)
Austria 300.05 64.99 21.66
Bahamas* 26.57 14.93 56.16
Bahrain* 47.59 36.91 77.58
Belgium 2746.05 199.04 7.25
Bermuda* 70.94 49.54 69.84
Bulgaria 204.59 54.48 26.63
Cayman Islands* 52.19 50.03 95.86
Croatia 325.80 20.42 6.27
Czech Republic 1478.28 169.29 11.45
Denmark 1198.47 34.31 2.86
Finland 1280.21 52.79 4.12
France 1681.44 ‐597.65 ‐35.54
Germany 3958.43 ‐320.30 ‐8.09
Gibraltar* 11.10 10.90 98.12
Greece 19.54 4.66 23.86
Guernsey* 147.83 86.36 58.42
Hong Kong* 5936.74 3504.11 59.02
Hungary 374.63 ‐20.39 ‐5.44
Ireland* 1534.24 708.59 46.19
Isle of Man* 107.65 57.02 52.97
Italy 2224.14 ‐264.47 ‐11.89
Jersey* 351.52 177.13 50.39
Latvia 35.84 1.70 4.75
Lithuania 19.85 1.48 7.48
Luxembourg* 4647.92 465.09 10.01
Malta* 159.87 30.93 19.35
Mauritius* 280.03 199.85 71.37
Monaco* 155.34 42.21 27.17
Netherlands 695.85 ‐76.45 ‐10.99
Poland 2522.78 ‐94.82 ‐3.76
Portugal 774.61 80.10 10.34
Romania 307.92 49.87 16.20
Singapore* 1191.96 470.33 39.46
Slovakia 369.43 15.86 4.29
Slovenia 72.52 15.21 20.97
Spain 1067.46 13.77 1.29
Sweden 171.40 ‐22.83 ‐13.32
Switzerland* 566.20 ‐136.95 ‐24.19
United Kingdom 4821.50 269.26 5.58
United States 8836.20 ‐40.80 ‐0.46
Total (in absolute value) 50774.68 8525.82 16.79
Total tax havens (in absolute value) 15287.70 5766.97 37.72
Total non-havens (in absolute value) 35486.98 2484.95 7.01
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Annex 1. List of the countries present in our dataset 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas*, Bahrain*, Belgium, Bermuda*, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Cayman 
Islands*, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Curacao, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, French Polynesia, Germany, Ghana,  Gibraltar*, 
Greece, Guernsey*, Guinea, Hong Kong*, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland*, Isle of 
Man*, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jersey*, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg*, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta*, Mauritius*, Mexico, Monaco*, 
Morocco, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore*, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland*, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay, Vietnam.  
*Tax havens, following the classification of Gravelle (2013). 
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